I would argue against Wittgenstein's concept of the language as exclusively social phenomena. Language has dual qualities. We may speak to ourselves as well as we can speak to the others. Speaking to the others we intend to make them understand our beliefs and experiences, while speaking to ourselves we intend our own minds to understand something better. If we are extraverts our language becomes very social indeed, and in this case Wittgenstein is almost right, but if we are introverts there can be great deviations, and our language becomes very strange for others (on those occasions we address them). People do not understand us; think we are extravagant, crazy, or too smart. Still there are always social and individual elements in our language and without individual specific qualities of the latter conversations would be completely boring and meaningless! There are peoples and there are persons!
I have to conclude this paper saying that:
1. there are valid concepts in TE.
- some new concepts of NE are not flawless
- the new perspectives enrich our contemplative abilities and knowledge
- the fully (for all times) satisfactory definitions or foundations are not likely to be proposed it would mean the end of our intellectual development,
- We have to respect great efforts of our ancestors and contemporaries to make sense of the world, internal and external, and it means that epistemology as well as philosophy at large is immortal!