institutions or actors beyond the national arena may be the creation of new internal organizational patterns better able to engage this dimension or else to enhance party management, or both. An even more significant incentive for parties to adapt to these changed circumstances, though long-term in its manifestation, is growing irrelevance, defined as a diminishing capability to alter existing macroeconomic policies and a shrinking scope of issues for which resolution can be promised in election campaigns. in mind that as I have defined Europeanization there is an emphasis upon adaptation and policy change, and further, that Europeanization does not mean either convergence or harmonization, the evidence of Europeanization will vary across and within political systems. Consequently, we should view European integration as an independent variable and increased government policy constraints and the public perception of growing irrelevance of conventional politics as dependent variables. European integration influences the operating arenas, or environments, of national political parties, and the Europeanization of parties is consequently a dependent variable. We should search for evidence of party adaptation to this changed environment, be it policy change and/or organisational change. In other words, the Europeanization of political parties will be reflected in their response to the changes in their environments. The response can be identified in new and sometimes innovative relationships, policies or structures. political parties, unlike government bureaucracies, individual politicians, and interest groups, do not have the ability or opportunity to develop privileged or intimate relationships with authoritative EU actors. Interest groups may independently approach similar organisations in other EU member states in order to create European level associations, or respond to entreaties by the European Commission itself. Government agencies and bureaucracies come into contact with EU institutions, or else are obliged to develop new administrative means with which to translate EU regulations, directives, etc. into corresponding national ones. National government politicians may come to develop personal in Council of Minister meetings, European Council, etc. All of these actors have a certain amount of latitude in their adaptation to EU inputs, or else have little choice, as in the case of government agencies, and must therefore liase as quickly as possible in order to avoid negative repercussions later. Political parties, as I assume, have the incentive and motivation to come to terms with the changes in their environment as it impacts their fortunes, but unlike the examples just given, they are constrained in a number of ways. The most basic dilemma, though perhaps not so obvious, is that there is little if anything in the way of resources that the EU possesses that can be translated into a positive gain for a political party. New and explicit rules forbid a transfer of EU funds to national parties: The funding for political parties at European level provided out of the Community budget may not be used to fund, either directly or indirectly, political parties at national level (Article 191 amendment in Treaty of Nice). Furthermore, political parties do not have an extra-national space or environment of consequence to operate within. The European Parliament is of course a European institution, and although we may state that the problem of irrelevance is common to all parties with a governing aspiration, the European parliament has neither the mandate nor the composition to intrude upon national circumstances. The benefits of participating in the EP are therefore indirect at best for national parties, inasmuch as legislation can refocus the impact of European integration on those areas that affect party fortunes most. Bereft of direct channels into authoritative EU decision-making, yet subject to influences upon their own operating environments, the Europeanization of parties is very much a complex phenomenon to identify. This is especially so as when in government, national party leaders are also in most cases national government leaders, and as such may pursue policies and strategies with an appeal beyond the strictly partisan (this is most likely the case in instances of coalition government). Although we may agree with Mairs identification of the two indirect effects upon political parties, neither is so dramatic as to cause immediate and high-profile changes. Nevertheless, it is possible to outline the broad areas where one may recognise changes that reflect a process of Europeanization. The particular task for the analyst is to trace changes back to an EU source, or else to recognise an intended usage of the EU as a possible aid in the resolution of an issue, or to evaluate the problems that the presence of the EU-issue presents for parties. Five areas of investigation for evidence of Europeanization in parties and party activity are proposed: 1) policy/programmatic content; 2) organisational; 3) patterns of party competition; 4) party-government relations; and 5) relations beyond the national party system.
) Programmatic change: One of the most explicit types of evidence of Europeanization will be modifications in party programmes. This can be measured quantitatively - increased mention of the EU in terms of European policy per se and in references to other policy areas, normally those considered to be domestic policy. Qualitatively, references to the EU as an additional factor in the pursuit of policies traditionally considered domestic, e.g. employment, immigration and asylum, etc., may develop. This will reflect enhanced European policy expertise among party specialists, as well as agreement with the leadership to integrate the European dimension into references to domestic policy. Additionally, references to co-operation with transnational organizations such as party federations, and European level institutions such as the European Parliament, may be made more explicit. Overall, policy and programmatic references to the role of the EU as a factor in domestic policy pursuits will become more sophisticated over time, as recognition of the impact of the EU becomes clearer, and strategies proposed for the EU develop. 2) Organizational change: Explicit statutory change in parties may not be readily evident, although change in practices and power relations may occur (see Raunio, this issue). Nevertheless, affiliation with European level institutions has generated some organizational modifications, and these have themselves evolved over time. Internal party rules and statutes regarding the role and influence of the delegation to the European Parliament, in particular, in party congresses and leadership bodies, may reflect the greater profile of European policy, and the leaderships need to manage it more closely. Organizational links with actors outside of the national territory, for instance transnational party federations, may also stimulate organizational innovation. 3) Patterns of party competition: To the extent the EU itself becomes politicized in national politics, new voters may be targeted in an opportunistic strategy, either in a pro- or anti- EU position. The politicization of the EU may become a concern for party management, even leading to new party formation. Several factors can instigate changing tactics and strategies by parties designed to capitalize on the EU issue. Among them may be existing patterns of competition incorporating the number of parties in a national party system, the presence of a strongly pro- or anti- EU party, and the nature of a partys dominant coalition (Panebianco, 1988) determining whether such a change in party strategy will cause internal dis-equilibrium. 4) Party-government relations: Participation of government leaders in EU forums may strain relations with the party on particular policies. In other words, inter-governmental bargaining - either in an inter-governmental conference, European Council, or Council of Ministers/COREPER - may distance the government/party leader from party programmatic positions in an unintended fashion. This may set into motion qualitative changes in the nature of party-government relations over time. Party-government relations on EU matters may become push-pull in nature. Government is pushed by party to maximalist positions on matters close to party programme, for example in the area of social policy for social democratic parties. Government is pulled by party to minimalist positions on institutional change, i.e., deeper integration, that run counter to notions of state sovereignty. This stance may not necessarily represent an ambivalence or hostility towards the EU itself, but may signal a preference towards retention of domestic control over policy areas which involve direct benefits accruing to the party, for instance where interest groups are aggregated within the policy orbit of a party. EU competence in a new policy area triggers a new constellation of interest group strategies, which may imply a de-emphasis on party relations.
) Relations beyond the national party system: Europeanization may result in new perspectives on transnational co-operation with parties from other EU member states to the extent that new organizational and programmatic activities are promoted. Niedermayer (1983) proposed a model of development for a European level party organization, differentiating between three stages: contact, co-operation, and integration. The four major party families represented in the European Parliament have some form of transnational party organization affiliating member national parties. The social democratic Party of European Socialists and the christian democratic (and increasingly conservative) European Peoples Party are the furthest along in the co-operation stage, with a permanent organization and frequent and p