Demographic crisis in Russia
Recent demographic trends in Russia have caused widespread public concern. Russia is experiencing unusually high death rates from nonnatural causes, many related to alcoholism. Life expectancy, especially among working-age males, has dropped precipitously. The Russian fertility rate has declined to among the world's lowest, while its abortion rate is the highest. As a result, for the first time in Russian history, the annual number of deaths has exceeded the number of births. Compounding these challenges, the population is aging rapidly--a trend that will accelerate over the next two decades--and immigration continues to increase, posing thorny political and social problems for a nation historically accustomed to a net outflow of people.
These events are widely seen as posing a national crisis for Russia. Civic leaders and the general public are especially concerned about the effects these trends may have on the progress of reform--for example, how a shrinking working-age population will support a growing number of elderly citizens. Opponents of reform have exploited these trends for political purposes. They have depicted these events as direct outcomes of reform and even as a conspiracy aimed at destroying the Russian state.
Policymakers and analysts are eager to learn more about the causes and consequences of these trends so that they can define appropriate policy options as the reform process continues. The underlying causes of these phenomena had previously not been studied in great depth. Policymakers in the former Soviet Union had no interest in policy informed by research; therefore, social and behavioral analyses of demographic trends were shunned in favor of descriptive, often historical, work. More recently, scholars using newly available information have begun to delve into the roots of Russian demographic changes and the long-term patterns underlying them.
To shed light on these issues, RAND and the Center for Demography and Human Ecology of the Russian Academy of Sciences invited a group of Russian demographers to present the results of their research. The aggregate picture that emerged from this groundbreaking work is more complicated than the "crisis" language suggests. Some of the demographic trends currently affecting Russia are the continuation of long-term patterns. Others are by-products of recent events, although not necessarily the reforms of the 1990s. Still others are harder to explain and have probably been exacerbated by the reforms and the current economic slump.
The "Depopulation" of Russia?
In 1992, Russia's population entered a period of negative growth--that is, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births combined with the number of immigrants. This was a first in the peacetime history of Russia.
This historic population decline has been met with increasing concern in some Russian circles. The Russian mass media have overflowed with alarming articles on population issues. Based on popular, nonprofessional interpretations of available vital statistics, some are calling "to save Russia from depopulation." As a result, the general public has been misled about population issues. The average citizen is likely to draw a direct connection between the current economic slump and a demographic crisis.
This alarmist view ignores long-term trends in fertility. As in many Western industrialized nations, Russia's fertility rate has fallen over the course of the 20th century from a relatively high level to a low one. In 1920, the average Russian woman was expected to give birth to about 7.5 children in her lifetime; in 1994, that number had fallen to 1.4. This demographic transition is characteristic of industrial and industrializing nations and is usually associated with greater numbers of women joining the work force and increased divorce and cohabitation, all of which tend to reduce family size and drive down fertility rates. Similar patterns have emerged in the United States and other Western countries.
However, Russia's fertility patterns have followed their own unique path over the past two decades. In addition to the decline in births, the age patterns of childbearing have been changing. In many Western countries, the peak childbearing age for women has grown older and now falls between 25 and 29; by contrast, the peak age in Russia has become younger, occurring between ages 20-24. Furthermore, by 1991, fertility between ages 15-19 exceeded that in the age groups over 30 and rivaled that of the 25-29 age group.
This tendency towards fertility at younger ages is reflected in marriage patterns. Between 1960 and 1995, the average marrying age of women in Russia fell by 4.2 years, from 26.2 to 22.0. This trend sharply distinguishes Russia from other industrialized nations, where the tendency is for women to postpone marriage and childbearing.
Contributing to this shift toward earlier childbearing and the low fertility rate has been Russia's high rate of abortion. The incidence of abortion in Russia is the world's highest. In 1992, there were 225 abortions per 100 births, far exceeding the second highest rate--Romania's--which was 157 per 100 births. Abortion has become Russia's main method of birth control. Abortions are easily obtained free of charge at virtually all clinics, while contraceptives have been unavailable. Despite the procedure's prevalence, it frequently poses health risks for Russian women because it is often performed without proper hygiene or anesthesia. Abortion has also played a role in concentrating women's reproductive activity in early years. Women try to achieve their desired number of children at a young age and then abort subsequent pregnancies without fear of secondary sterility, which often results from frequent abortions. Only in recent years, as the availability of effective contraceptives has increased and the negative effects of abortion have been openly reported by the media, has the number of abortions begun to decline.
Like the trend in fertility, Russia's current net immigration inflow perpetuates trends that emerged earlier, in this case during the late 1960s and 1970s. The size of this inflow increased dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union but appears to have subsided somewhat. While Russia currently lacks the infrastructure and experience to deal with immigrants on a large scale, immigration is sometimes weighed as an option for offsetting the natural population decline.
Russia's current population picture need not be viewed as a short-term crisis. A more plausible explanation is that fertility patterns are resuming their long-term trend after a temporary increase in the 1980s that stemmed from government policies aimed at inducing families to have more children. These measures included paid maternity leave and extra benefits in housing and services for families with three children or more. The effect of these measures was to shorten the interval between births. The current pattern suggests that the older timing is reasserting itself. Economic hard times may have further influenced this pattern. Although a two-child family is still the norm, economic difficulties may force postponement of the second child.
The "Graying" of the Russian Population
The decline in fertility is contributing to a rapid aging of the Russian population. Between 1959 and 1990, the number of persons aged 60 and over doubled. As a result, at the beginning of the 1990s, the proportion of the population aged 60 or over reached 16 percent. This figure will reach 20 percent by 2015. By that year, nearly one of out of every three people over 60 will be 75 or older.
The trends of population growth and aging in Russia have been profoundly affected by catastrophic events, such as the two world wars, the civil war of 1917-1922, and famines in the early 1920s and '30s. These catastrophes have distorted the population pyramid--the typical age distribution and balance between male and female in the population. For example, huge losses during World War II have caused Russia to have the lowest overall male-to-female ratio in the world, especially among the elderly. The irregularities of this pyramid will continue to have an impact on the number of births and the rate of population growth and aging for several decades. This pattern affects such vital spheres as school enrollment, employment, and retirement.
Another determinant of the current age structure in Russia has been the declining fertility rate, which is reducing the number of young people in the population. In the past, the prevailing age structure compensated for the long-term trend toward lower fertility. The average age of the population was relatively young, and many women were of childbearing age. Beginning in the 1990s, however, this is no longer the case. The age structure is now such that it will promote a population decrease rather than an increase. Continued low fertility will only accelerate this effect.
The Epidemiological Situation: Deteriorating Russian Health
Perhaps the only genuine crisis aspect of current Russian demographic trends appears in increased rates of mortality, which have been especially dramatic among working-age men. In 1992, there was a sharp increase in deaths from nonnatural causes. By 1994, mortality rates for males between ages 15 and 64 were about twice as high as they had been in 1986. Rising alcoholism and related conditions have figured prominently in this trend. In the mid-1980s, an anti-alcohol campaign championed by Mikhail Gorbachev was responsible for a brief reversal in the mortality trend, but the increase resumed after the campaign was abandoned in the