Экономика

  • 101. Palestinian liberation organization
    Информация пополнение в коллекции 12.01.2009

    The PNC, which is the highest decision-making body of the PLO, is considered to be the parliament of all Palestinians inside and outside of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. The PNC normally sets PLO policies, elects the Executive Committee and makes the necessary changes in its own membership, as well as changes to the Palestine National Charter (a special meeting is required) and to the Fundamental Law of the organization. The PNC also elects a speaker, two deputies and a secretary, who make up the Bureau of the Council. The Council has its own standing committees for various aspects of its work, such as its legal and political committees. The composition of the PNC represents all sectors of the Palestinian community worldwide and includes numerous organizations of the resistance movement, political parties, popular organizations (each of the above is represented by specific quotas) and independent personalities and figures from all sectors of life, including intellectuals, religious leaders and businessmen. The current membership of the PNC stands at X, including all of the 88 elected members of the Palestine Legislative Council (PLC).

  • 102. PEST – анализ
    Вопросы пополнение в коллекции 12.01.2009

    PEST Анализ это инструмент, предназначенный для выявления политических (Policy), экономических (Economy), социальных (Society) и технологических (Technology) аспектов внешней среды, которые могут повлиять на стратегию компании. Политика изучается потому, что она регулирует власть, которая в свою очередь определяет среду компании и получение ключевых ресурсов для её деятельности. Основная причина изучения экономики это создание картины распределения ресурсов на уровне государства, которая является важнейшим условием деятельности предприятия. Не менее важные потребительские предпочтения определяются с помощью социальной компоненты PEST Анализа. Последним фактором является технологическая компонента. Целью её исследования принято считать выявление тенденций в технологическом развитии, которые зачастую являются причинами изменений и потерь рынка, а также появления новых продуктов.

  • 103. Pest–исследование предприятия ОАО "КамАЗ"
    Дипломная работа пополнение в коллекции 21.12.2011

    За 2010 год в РФ было импортировано 11001 автомобиль, в том числе 7599 новых и 3402 подержанных грузовых автомобиля, говорится в исследовании, подготовленном Russian Automotive Market Research. Увеличение импорта грузовиков из-за границы ведущих мировых производителей может повлиять на конкурентоспособность фирмы, тем что наша продукция уступает заграничной в качестве. А снижение наоборот, укрепление позиций на российском рынке и увеличению прибыли организации. На экспорт же приходится уделять особое внимание, так как регулирование экспорта и разнообразие таможенных пошлин в экспортируемых странах, должно заставить организацию выбирать наименее убыточный вариант экспорта своей продукции.

  • 104. PR фирмы. Внутренние мероприятия и корпоративная культура для формирования имиджа и повышения эффект...
    Реферат пополнение в коллекции 09.12.2008

    Список использованных источников

    1. Алешина И. В. Паблик Рилейшнз для менеджеров. Курс лекций. М., 2002.
    2. Бибарцева Т. С. Учебно-игровой тренинг специалистов социо-культурной сферы. СПб., 1999.
    3. Богданов Е. Н., Зазыкин В. Г. Психологические основы «Паблик рилейшнз». 2-е издание. СПб., 2003.
    4. Варакута С. А., Егоров Ю.Н. Связи с общественностью. М., 2003.
    5. Вершковский Э. В. Режиссура массовых клубных представлений. Л., 2003.
    6. Викентьев И. Л. Приёмы рекламы и public relations: 215 примеров, 130 учебных задач и 18 практических приложений. СПб., 2001.
    7. Виханский О., Наумов А. Менеджмент: человек. стратегия, организация, процесс. Учебник. М., 2005.
    8. Демин Ю. М. Бизнес PR. М., 2003.
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    10. Камерон К., Курнн Р. Диагностика и изменение организационной культуры. СПб., 2001.
    11. Лэйхифф Дж. М., Пенроуз Дж.М. Бизнес - коммуникации. СПб., 2001.
    12. Мазаев А. И. Праздник, как социально-культурное явление. М., 1998.
    13. Мескон М.Х., Альберт М., Хедоури Ф. Основы менеджмента. М., 2002
    14. Новиков В. Прибавка к премии. Праздники для сотрудников стали неотъемлемым элементом корпоративной культуры. Эксперт Северо-Запад». 12.11.2001.
    15. Ньюстром Дж. В., Дэвис К. Организационное поведение. СПб., 2000.
    16. Панфилова А. П. Деловая коммуникация в профессиональной деятельности. СПб, 1999.
    17. Потеряхин А. Л. Психология управления. Основы межличностного общения. К., 1999.
    18. Почепцов Г. Г. Коммуникативные технологии двадцатого века. М., 2000.
    19. Радугин А., Радугин К. Введение в менеджмент: социология организаций и управления. Воронеж, 2005
    20. Райс Эл, Траут Д. Позиционирование. Битва за узнаваемость. СПб., 2002.
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  • 105. Prising
    Информация пополнение в коллекции 12.01.2009

    The way firms approach the pricing problems may vary. In small firms prices are usually determined by the higher leadership. In large companies department supervisors and assortment supervisors deal with the pricing problems. But still at this level the higher leadership determines the general targets of the price policy. The higher leadership also confirms prices offered by managers of the lower supervision. In space, railways, gas and oil industries companies often organize special pricing departments, which determine prices or help the others do it. Such employees as sales department managers, production supervisors, finance managers and accountants are those who also influence the price policy.

  • 106. Private label
    Реферат пополнение в коллекции 09.12.2008

    Если рассматривать отношение потребителя к «частным маркам», то достаточно очевидно, что перспектив у владельцев сетей достаточно много. Давайте заглянем немного в историю. Около150 лет назад понятие зарегистрированной торговой марки еще не существовало. Первый закон о товарных знаках, был принят в США в 1870 г. Он защищал и потребителя и производителя, от некачественной продукции и подделок. С тех пор началась гонка. С развитием технологий продвижения марки и формирования потребительского отношения, возникновения маркетинга и брендинга, а также рекламных технологий, появилась возможность продавать товары в мега объемах и с достаточно высокой нормой прибыли. Была проложена четкая граница между «брендом» и «не брендом». Причем, «брендированным» стало все - от спичек до стран.
    С одной стороны, эта «гонка» подстегивала производителей к совершенствованию производственных технологий, заставляла вкладывать огромные средства в исследования, т.е. двигала прогресс. С другой, цивилизованный мир стал огромной торговой площадкой по продаже брендов, где покупателю настоятельно внушалось и внушается до сих пор, что только брендированный продукт может быть качественным. Податливость такому внушению оборачивается потребителю лишними финансовыми затратами. Но что поделать, всеобщий психоз охватил почти всех, во всяком случае, в городах.
    В России сейчас не брендируется, лишь ленивый производитель. Еще 15 лет назад, мы покупали сахар, муку или консервы, не имея возможности выбирать, брали все, что было.
    Сейчас мы постоянно стоим перед выбором: ЧТО НАМ ПОКУПАТЬ? Этим мы обязаны и специалистам по маркетингу и брендингу. Конечно же, в работе специалистов данной области ничего плохого нет, наоборот они борются за эстетику и помогают выстраивать производителю правильные отношения с потребителем, прописывая стратегические программы, которые автоматически заставляют устранять какие-либо слабые места в производстве или обслуживании клиента. Но опять повторимся, покупателю, приходится выкладывать несколько большую сумму за технологии и научный подход.
    Конкуренция на рынке заставляет искать новые решения, в борьбе за кошелек потребителя. И появление private label как раз и есть то альтернативное решение, дающее возможность покупателю чувствовать себя вполне защищенным, а сетям неплохо зарабатывать и соответственно развиваться.

  • 107. Private sector and human-resource development in Georgia
    Курсовой проект пополнение в коллекции 23.02.2006

    RecommendationsObjectives to be AchievedPerformance IndicatorsResponsible AgenciesDurationComment

    • Conduct the 2nd round of the privatization process through GSE;
    • Involve the Investment Funds into the privatization process.
    • Privatization process is improved (Objective 13);
    • Potential of the capital market is increased (Objective 2).
    • The companies included in the privatization list of the 2nd round should be privatized through GSE;
    • A number of (at least 3-5) Investment Funds take part into the privatization process.DSPM
    • NSCG
    GSE
    • 1-2 years
    • With the technical assistance of the WB.
    • About 80% of the leading Georgian companies, which currently are not traded at GSE, have to be included into the list of the securities traded at GSE;
    • Government of Georgia (GoG) must introduce some incentives (e.g. simplified tax regime) for those corporations that decide to be listed at GSE.
    • Majority of leading companies are traded at GSE (Objective 4);
    • Potential of the capital market is increased (Objective 2).
    • Majority of leading Georgian companies are listed at GSE;
    • Simplified tax regime is introduced for the corporations traded at GSE.PoG
    • MoF NSCG
    GSE
    • 1-2 years
    • With the technical assistance of the WB
    • Prepare and adopt the amendments into the Tax Code of Georgia (TCG);
    • Conduct the tax administration reform.
    • The tax system is simplified (Objective 7);
    • There is an adequate tax code (Objective 6);
    • Incentives for paying bribes/Hiding profits are reduced (Objective 11);
    • The level of corruption is reduced (Objective 10);
    • Transparency of corporate disclosure is increased (Objective 12);
    • Reliability of financial disclosure is increased (Objective 28);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • Business-friendly tax code is in place;
    • Simplified tax regime for securities and corporations are established;
    • No frequent changes into the tax code are made;
    • Collection of taxes is increased;
    • Companies file more reliable information about their profits;
    • Companies increase the transparency and quality of corporate disclosure. PoG
    • MoF STD
    • 6 months
    • Ongoing
    • With the technical assistance of the WB;
    • In consultations with NSCG.
    • Make amendments into Law on Audit Activity (LAA) to adopt International Standards on Auditing (ISA);
    • Ministry of Finances (MoF), together with Parliamentary Council on Audit Activity (PCAA), requires audit companies to conduct audits in compliance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISA).
    • ISA is adopted into the law (Objective 34);
    • There are adequate auditing standards (Objective 33);
    • Incentives for paying bribes/Hiding profits are reduced (Objective 11);
    • The level of corruption is reduced (Objective 10);
    • Transparency of corporate disclosure is increased (Objective 12);
    • Reliability of financial disclosure is increased (Objective 28);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • International Standards on Auditing is adopted into law;
    • Audits are conducted in compliance with International Standards on Auditing;
    • Companies file more reliable information about their profits;
    • Companies increase the transparency and quality of corporate disclosure.PoG
    • PCAA
    MoF
    • 6 months
    • Ongoing
    • With the technical assistance of the WB;
    • In consultations with NSCG and GSIA.
    • National Securities commission of Georgia (NSCG) requires reporting companies to prepare their financial accounts in compliance with the International Accounting Standards (IAS).
    • IAS is enforced (Objective 9);
    • There are adequate accounting standards (Objective 8);
    • Incentives for paying bribes/Hiding profits are reduced (Objective 11);
    • The level of corruption is reduced (Objective 10);
    • Transparency of corporate disclosure is increased (Objective 12);
    • Reliability of financial disclosure is increased (Objective 28);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • Reporting companies prepare their financial accounts in compliance with the International Accounting Standards;
    • Companies file more reliable information about their profits;
    • Companies increase the transparency and quality of corporate disclosure.NSCG
    • MoF
    • 3 months
    • Ongoing
    • In consultations with GSIA.
    • National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Georgia (NACB) conducts the assessment of the activities carried out by the tax administrations.
    • The level of corruption is reduced (Objective 10);
    • Transparency of corporate disclosure is increased (Objective 12);
    • Reliability of financial disclosure is increased (Objective 28);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • Index of corruption is lowered;
    • Companies file more reliable information about their profits;
    • Companies increase the transparency and quality of corporate disclosure.NACB
    • Ongoing
    • With the technical assistance of the WB.
    • Georgian Securities Industry Association (GSIA) should conduct training courses, seminars, workshops, etc. amongst shareholders, company directors and members of supervisory boards on the best practices of corporate governance;
    • NSCG enforces the corporate governance standards.
    • Educational campaign is conducted (Objective 27);
    • Shareholders have sufficient knowledge about their rights (Objective 26);
    • Entrenched culture of abusive self-dealing is lessened (Objective 16);
    • Shareholders' meetings are held regularly (Objective 29);
    • The role of supervisory boards is increased (Objective 35);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • Majority of company directors and members of supervisory boards, as well as interested shareholders take part in training courses;
    • NSCG conduct quarterly/annual audits of JSCs;
    • Shareholders' meetings are held annually;
    • Supervisory boards' meetings are held on a quarterly basis.NSCG
    • GSIA
    • 1 year
    • Ongoing
    • With the financial and technical assistance of the USAID.
    • Prepare and adopt the regulations for Pension Funds;
    • Prepare and adopt the regulations for Mutual Funds.
    • Legislation for financial intermediaries is adopted (Objective 23);
    • Financial intermediaries are well-developed (Objective 21);
    • Large domestic institutional investors are present at GSE (Objective 20);
    • Larger volumes of capital resources are directed to GSE (Objective 18);
    • There is a competition at GSE (Objective 22);
    • There is a strong market for corporate control (Objective 30).
    • Private Pension Funds start functioning in the country;
    • Mutual Funds start functioning in the country;
    • Large domestic institutional investors take part in trading at GSE;
    • Volume of trades at GSE is increased substantially;
    • Number of participants in trading at GSE is increased;
    • Investment funds take active role in the work of supervisory boards/shareholders meetings.PoG
    • MoF NSCG GSE
    • 1 year
    • With the technical assistance of the WB.
    • Adopt the investment compensation schemes;
    • Strengthen the bankruptcy system;
    • Adopt the rules for takeovers.
    • Adequate legislation for investor protection is adopted (Objective 24);
    • Financial intermediaries are well-developed (Objective 21);
    • Large domestic institutional investors are present at GSE (Objective 20);
    • Larger volumes of capital resources are directed to GSE (Objective 18);
    • There is a competition at GSE (Objective 22);
    • There is a strong market for corporate control (Objective 30).
    • Investment compensation schemes are in place;
    • Regulations for the bankruptcy system are in place;
    • Rules for takeovers are in place;
    • Large domestic institutional investors take part in trading at GSE;
    • Volume of trades at GSE is increased substantially;
    • Number of participants in trading at GSE is increased;
    • Investment funds take active role in the work of supervisory boards/shareholders meetings.MoF
    • NSCG GSE
    • 1 year
    • With the technical assistance of the WB.
    • Assign an adequate Inspection, Investigation and Enforcement power, including the criminal prosecution authority to the National Securities Commission of Georgia (NSCG);
    • Increase the budgetary support of the NSCG;
    • Make the NSCG accountable to the President of Georgia;
    • Develop the code of ethics for NSCG;
    • Develop the program to supervise SelfRegulatory Organizations (SROs);
    • NSCG installs the market surveillance and stock watch system.
    • Power of the NSCG is increased (Objective 40);
    • Budgetary support of the NSCG is increased (Objective 37);
    • Accountability of the NSCG is increased (Objective 36);
    • Code of ethics for the NSCG staff is developed (Objective 38);
    • Program to supervise Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) is developed (Objective 39);
    • The NSCG does function in an effective manner (Objective 39);
    • Regulations are enforced in an effective manner (Objective 42);
    • Trading transparency is enforced (Objective 43);
    • Unfair trading is deterred (Objective 44);
    • Fairness of Market is ensured (Objective 45).
    • NSCG has the criminal prosecution authority;
    • Budget allocations to NSCG is increased;
    • Rules are in place that make the NSCG accountable to the President of Georgia;
    • The code of ethics for NSCG is in place;
    • The program to supervise SROs is in place;
    • Trades are conducted in a transparent manner/information is easily available;
    • Facts of unfair trading are detected and/or deterred.PoG
    • NSCG GSE
    • 6 months 1 year
    • In consultation with the IOSCO.
    • Special training courses are conducted for the judges dealing with corporate disputes/ protection of shareholders rights.
    • Georgian court system is improved (Objective 32);
    • Shareholders rights are enforced adequately (Objective 31);
    • Fairness of Market is ensured (Objective 45).
    • Judges have sufficient knowledge of corporate/securities laws;
    • Number of complaints against judges is reduced.
    • MoJ NSCG GSIA
    • 6 months

  • 108. Privatization process in Lithuania
    Информация пополнение в коллекции 12.01.2009

    Recently Public Limited Companies Lithuanian Telecom ("Lietuvos Telekomas") and Hotel Lietuva (Vie?butis "Lietuva") have been privatised. Privatisation of these enterprises is carried out through transparent competitive procedure of international tenders prepared and executed by internationally renowned advisors and arrangers. For the enterprises which have a strategic importance to the Lithuanian economy, the Government has devised a special procedure of two stages for their privatisation and some of them are already privatised. Public Limited Companies Lithuanian Telecom (Lietuvos Telekomas) has been purchased by the strategic investor - Consortium "Amber Teleholding" of Sweden "Telia" and Finnish "Sonera". The Government accepted sale option of 60 per cent shares. In the energy sector, the oil refinery AB "Ma?eikiu Nafta" is also being prepared to privatisation. Using the International tender, a consortium of financial and other advisors, led by Banque Paribas, has been selected as the winner of tender. At the moment it is under the negotiations with potential investors. The Government of Lithuania is also privatising two airlines: "Lietuvos avialinijos" and "Aviakompanija Lietuva". Recently, the companies have been consolidated so that "Aviakompanija Lietuva" became a subsidiary of a major airline. The privatisation of the company is foreseen in 1999.

  • 109. Proposal of joint european project CHAIN-E
    Информация пополнение в коллекции 12.01.2009

    Outcomes/activitiesNOVDECJANFEBMARAPRMAYJUNJULAUGSEPOCTDuration (weeks / days)1. 20 East-West student mobility.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO52 weeks1.2Creation, annual updating, setting up in the Internet of information packages (in English language). OOOOOOOO8 weeks1.3Organization of access to the resources of the host university.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO35 weeks1.4Accommodation of foreign students. Organization of their leisure and security during staying abroad.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO35 weeks1.5Language training of the outgoing students.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO26 weeks1.6Organizational and informational students support.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO52 weeks1.7Supervising of the outgoing students. OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO35 weeks1.8Application of ECTS for the studying results recognition.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO22 weeks1.9 Conduction of the international conference on the results of student exchanges.X3 days1.10 Organization of 1st annual regional conference on the problems of economic education.X3 days2. 35 East-East student mobility.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX52 weeks2.2Creation, setting up in the Internet of information packages of the consortium universities (in the Russian language).XXXXXXXX8 weeks2.3Organization of access to the resources of the host university.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX43 weeks2.4Supervising of the outgoing students.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX43 weeks2.5Accommodation of other-town students.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX43 weeks2.6Organizational and informational students support. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX52 weeks2.7Application of ECTS for the studying results recognition.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX22 weeks3. Internationalization of educational economic programs at the consortium universities.OOOOOOOOOOOOO=OOOOOOOOOOOOOX28 weeks3.1 Comparative analysis of educational programs of the home and host universities. OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO17 weeks3.2 Selection of foreign study courses, which are of an interest for the sending university.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO17 weeks3.3 Foreseeing the ways to overcome the differences in educational programs.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO17 weeks3.5 Short-term visits of administrative and academic staff to coordinate student mobility.=1 weeks3.6 Staff training periods to perfect the teaching methods; intensive courses on credit transfer methods.= = = =4 weeks3.7 Expending of the library resources of partner universities.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO52 weeks3.8 Provision of project participants with an access to the computer databasesOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO52 weeks3.9 Creation of a computer database of educational programs, curricula and teaching aids in Economics.OOOOOOOOOOOOO13 weeks3.10 Organization of inter-university seminar on internationalization of higher economic education.X3 days3.11 Publishing of 3 issues of Newsletter on internationalization of higher education.XXXXXXXXXXXXXX14 weeks4. A network of branches of the Regional Centre for Students Exchanges (RCSE).OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO52 weeks4.5 Organization of meetings, conferences, seminars on the exchange of experience.XX2 weeks4.6 Establishing of direct links between the ECTS coordinators of the Ural consortium and the European universities, participation in the work of the ECTS ALUMNI AssociationOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO52 weeks4.7 Publishing activities (Newsletters, see Outcome 3 Activity 3.11).XXXXXXXXXXXXXX14 weeks5. 7 academics deliver lectures at the universities-participants (see Outcome 3).XXX== = =OOOOOXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX27 weeks5.1 Elaboration of new study courses and their methodological provision. XXX== = = = =XXXXXXXX17 weeks5.2 Organizational and informational support of the outgoing lecturers.XXX== = =OOOOOXXXXXX18 weeks5.3 Publishing activities (Newsletters, see Outcome 3 Activity 3.11).XXXXXXXXXXXXXX14 weeks6. Project management.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO52 weeks6.1 Annual planning of the activities and of budget (RBAP).OOOO4 weeks6.2 Annual report on done activities to the Tempus Department of the ETF.OOOO4 weeks6.3 Weekly holding of operating workshops with liaison-officers of Ural Consortium.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO52 weeks6.4 Coordinating Council meetings of managers of works on the project in Ural universities (monthly)XXXXXXXXXXXX12 days6.5 The Ural Rectors Council meetings: The intermediate results and perspectives of the project activities (every half-year)XX2 days6.6 Holding of coordinating workshops of representatives of all consortium universities.O1 day6.7 Participation of representatives of consortium universities in the annual coordinating conference of ETF Tempus- Department (Turin, Italy).

  • 110. Protectionnism and Free Trade in Economical Doctrines
    Информация пополнение в коллекции 12.01.2009

    Condillac applied his utility theory to international trade and demonstrated that what holds true for exchange between two persons is largely applicable also to commerce between nations. The inequality of subjunctive valuations he saw reflected, on a larger scale, in the total exchange transactions between nations. He decried the foolishness of establishing trade barriers because it is in the very nature of exchange that both parties will benefit - what is offered for sale always being valued less highly than what is acquired in return. If each nation insisted on selling only, they would all eventually wind up without foreign trade and deprive themselves of its benefits. Condillac went beyond his predecessors Hume and Cantillon in showing that even if other nations continue putting up obstacles to international exchange, it will be advantageous for a particular country to adhere to free-trade principles. He concludes, somewhat optimistically, that when trading enjoys complete and permanent liberty, wealth is bound to spread everywhere.

  • 111. Public Finance Perspective - Latvia
    Реферат пополнение в коллекции 09.12.2008
  • 112. Public relations в коммуникационной политике
    Реферат пополнение в коллекции 04.08.2010
  • 113. Redesigning the Dragon Financial Reform in the Peoples Republic of China
    Реферат пополнение в коллекции 09.12.2008

    Prior to economic reforms, Chinas tax structure was based on the Soviet model. Enterprises remitted their profit to the government, retaining only what was necessary to pay expenses. Revenues were collected by local governments, and a certain amount was filtered up to the central government. In 1984, this was replaced by a system of enterprise income taxation reform, in which companies were taxed on their profits, as the government tried to respond to economic imbalances created by the emerging private sector. The turnover tax (the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax, or CICT), which had been the largest contributor to the governments annual revenue, was replaced with a business tax, a product tax, and a value-added tax (VAT). These featured highly differentiated tax rates across sectors, types of good and service, and form of firm ownership. Most private firms paid a base tax rate of 33%, while most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were nominally taxed at 55%. In practice, however, taxes paid were governed by a contract responsibility system (CRS), in which enterprises negotiated individually with local government units. This system created conflict of interest because often the local government was both tax collector and enterprise owner. Not only were there differentiated rates which distort economic activity, there was little incentive for full tax remittance back to the central government under this system. (See Table 6 in Appendix, page 23, for a description of the tax structure from 1985-1991.)

  • 114. ROLLS- ROYCE
    Реферат пополнение в коллекции 09.12.2008

    Название компании сохраняет память о двух ее основателях блестящем аристократе и спортсмене Чарльзе Роллсе и талантливом и упорном инженере-самоучке и предпринимателе Генри Ройсе. Первым удачным творением фирмы стал 6-цилиндровый автомобиль 1906 года (модель 40/50). Его тринадцатый экземпляр (1907) создан при участии фирмы «Баркер», снабдившей шасси открытым пятиместным кузовом и окрасившим корпус в серебряный цвет (посеребренными были и некоторые детали, и без того сверкавшие после тщательнейшей отделки вручную). Этот «Серебряный призрак» (Silver Ghost), стал едва ли не самым известным автомобилем в мире, в котором изысканность и совершенство линий сочеталось с высочайшим качеством материалов и сборки, а конструкция шасси была создана классически просто. Сделанный Генри Ройсом мотор из двух 3-цилиндровых блоков с алюминиевым (редкость в то время!) картером, оснащенный двумя свечами в каждом цилиндре с двойной системой зажигания трамблерной и от магнето, обеспечивал «Серебряному призраку» почти бесшумный и плавный ход. Знатоки сочли важнейшей деталью автомобиля коленчатый вал, сделанный с такой превосходной уравновешенностью, что левая и правая его части были идеально похожи. Этот автомобиль заявил о себе на весь мир участием в 2000-мильной гонке по всей Англии, показавшей и его выдающиеся спортивные способности. В Британии автомобиль выпускался до 1925, а в Соединенных Штатах в 1920-1926 годах. Конструкция, тип кузовов, отделка постоянно менялись, а качество всегда оставалось не просто высоким, а недостижимым. Небольшие серии получали названия «ЛондонЭдинбург» (в честь автопробега в 1911), «Альпийский орел» (Alpine Eagle; в честь альпийского ралли 1913), для Индии выпускался «Колониал» (Colonial). На шасси последней модели во время Первой мировой войны для британских вооруженных сил выпускались броневики «Континентал» (Continental).

  • 115. Russian Federation Country Study. A Public Finance Perspective
    Реферат пополнение в коллекции 09.12.2008

     

    1. Isaak I. Dore , 1995 Distribution of Governmental Power Under the Constitution of Russia" in Parker School Journal of Eastern European Law" v. 2 p. 675
    2. ibid p. 681
    3. ibid p. 865
    4. ibid p. 691
    5. ibid p. 678
    6. ibid p. 688
    7. With the current political situation we can say that the budget as a whole, without doubt, will not pass the Duma by the end of the year.
    8. The Moscow Times May 21, 1996. p. 54.
    9. World Paper. September, 1996 p. 33
    10. TNI 73-22, 1996
    11. TNI 22/16, 1992, John Turro
    12. Joint Letter No VG-4-12/25N of June 16, 1995
    13. Doc 96-947
    14. Much of the literature on tax assignment argues that the personal income tax(PIT), generally one of the more important taxes in revenue terms, should be retained by the central government, largely for redistributional and stabilization reasons. Nevertheless, the central government may give local governments a share in the PIT.
    15. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International. January 25, 1993
    16. NOVECONCOMMERSANT. July 28, 1994. p. 2
    17. In Russia, this tax is mostly levied at a national level because of the administrative convenience, these taxes have been levied at the producer level, not the retail level; and in the transition economy context this often translates into a tax on a few manufacturers as in Russia, for example, there are cigarette factories in only 21 of its 2000 "raions" (Comparative Economic Studies Winter 1994, Vol. 36, No. 4), or sometimes on the single monopoly producer. Thus, only a few producing districts would benefit from levying these taxes and revenues from them would accrue to only a few localities
    18. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International. January 25, 1993
    19. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International. January 25, 1993
    20. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International.January 25, 1993
    21. The British Broadcasting Corporation March 15, 1991
    22. Scot Antel. The Moscow Times. May 21, 1996
    23. Though temporary steps were made like creating special colleges that are attached to courts of arbitration, we suppose that creating a special tax courts is essential here
    24. Of course, taxes existed but people could not evade them as they were centralized and in theory all means of production were owned by the state.
    25. Washington Post. October 12, 1996. p. A25
    26. But we are afraid that this provision will not benefit the economy
    27. Betsy McKay. The Wall Street Journal.October 29, 1996. p. A12
    28. Comment & Analysis; Statistics; Forecast; November 1996 p. 2
    29. Information Services Quest Economics Database Credit Suisse Financial Forecast, 1996
    30. Reuter Textline Reinsurance, October 31, 1996
    31. In our opinion, inflation will come down further in 1997, to approximately 15 percent. Also, Russia continues to fail in its economic performance of it fiscal and monetary policy within the framework established by the International Monetary Fund.
    32. The Moscow Times. March 27, 1996
    33. Dmitry Falcovich, head of the macroeconomic department with Alliance-Menatep
    34. Russian Federation: Toward Medium-Term Viability. 1996. IBRD/World Bank p.39
    35. Fiscal Management in Russia. 1996. IBRD p. 39
    36. Fiscal Management in Russia. p. 22
    37. John E. Elliot and A.F. Dowla. Gorbachev, Perestroika and Democratizing Socialism" in International Journal of Social Economics" v. 21 p. 78
    38. Linda J. Cook. 1995 The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed." Harvard University Press: Cambridge p.2 Cook suggests the following as empirical evidence: 1. That the Soviet regime consistently deliver to workers economic security and social welfare; 2. That the regime deliver these policy goods because it is constrained by it perception of workers' expectations or its fear of labor discontent if it fails to deliver them; [and] 3. that workers give in exchange political compliance and quiescence. p. 5
    39. Vladmir Mau. 1996 The Political History of Economic Reform in Russia, 1985-1994. Center for Research into Communist Economies p. 59
    40. John Dunlop. 1993. The Rise of Russia and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire. Princeton University Press: Princeton. p. 267
    41. Cook p.141
    42. ibid p.187
    43. Thomas A. Mroz and Barry M. Popkin. 1995. Poverty and Economic Transition in the Russian Federation" in Economic Development and Cultural Change . V 44 p.3
    44. ibid p.4
    45. ibid p. 4
    46. Russia: Social Protection During Transition and Beyond International Bank For Reconstruction and Development Report No. 11748-RU. p. 23
    47. Vladimir Mikhalev Social Security in Russia under Economic Transformation" in Europe-Asia Studies v. 48 n.1 (note: As this source came from an electronic medium, I have omitted page numbers--DL)
    48. ibid
    49. IBRD Report No. 11748-Ru. p. 35
    50. ibid p. 11
    51. EBRD p. 40
    52. ibid
    53. BISNIS Country Report
    54. OMRI November 31, 1996
    55. OMRI October 4, 1996
    56. Financial Times. September 23, 1996
    57. Of course, it is possible to lower administrative costs and improve overall efficiency in the tax system by going to a more computerized system but resistance to change due to unquestionable job loss is quite evident in the Russian government.
    58. Komsomol'skaya Pravda. Sept. 24, 1996
  • 116. Russian Foreign Policy
    Курсовой проект пополнение в коллекции 10.06.2012

    after the collapse of the Soviet Union a young Russian diplomacy could not boast with the experience of designing doctrines regarding international policies. The first conceptual constructions in the area of foreign policy were in fact derived from the theoretical framework that was available in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. Of course, it was necessary to change the words and ideas in order to form a decent policy. But it was easier than to change the logic of professionals and politically active public, which had been educated largely on the basis of a Soviet model. Perhaps this is why the ideological baggage of the first generation of Russian foreign policy doctrine is a reinterpretation of a selected Soviet ideas regarding this matter. First of all, there were two ideas: one of Lenin's time, the second from Gorbachev's era. The first thesis, adopted by the new Russian government and easily assimilated by the public, sounded as "the provision of a favorable international environment for building democracy in Russia" (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," 1992 / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 2. Documents / Comp. TA Shaklein. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 17, 21). He was in tune with the way Lenin proclaimed the main goal of foreign policy of Soviet Russia as fostering external conditions for the construction of socialism in the country. The second point was less archaic, but it also had not been innovative. It continued the logic of the "new political thinking" of M. Gorbachev the integral part of which was the idea of universal values. But while for the new political thinking the principal value has been the survival of humanity and its salvation from nuclear war, the new thinking "in Yeltsin's view" was regarded as universal interest assigned to the democratization of the world. It was assumed that this democratization is attainable through joint efforts of all democratic countries and since year 1991 Russia has reckoned itself as such kind of country. From this view the idea of "democratic solidarity" had emerged which had been viewed as modern and natural reinterpretation of well understood by the Russians old Soviet concept of "socialist internationalism." This phenomenon was interpreted in the USSR as the doctrine of the common historical destiny and the fundamental interests of socialist countries. Similarly, the "democratic solidarity" was pictured as an attractive hypothesis with the idea that all democratic countries (including Russia) will act in solidarity, with regard for one another, as befits the states with common interests. The idea of a favorable external environment for the sake of building democracy was more pragmatic. Hypothesis about solidarity of actions has been more impregnated with ideology. On the level of practice both of them intertwined. But once accustomed to perceive the world primarily through the prism of ideology, as was customary in the Soviet Union, the new leaders of Russia (Boris Yeltsin's entourage and the president himself) exaggerated the role of solidarity with the West, seeing it as a tool to ensure a favorable international environment. The latter required the new regime to survive, the destruction of the Soviet system and the creation instead of it some version of the democratic system. Diplomacy of early 1990s had to solve complex problems. It had to build a new Russia in a dramatically changed international environment, trying to minimize the inevitable losses. Thus occurred a difficult political and psychological problem. The Soviet Union acted as a unique actor and the main force opposing "global capitalism" on the world stage. New Russia had to master the role of a regular actor among democratic countries. Soviet citizens had been accustomed to believe that they live in "the world's first country of triumphant socialism." This was an important component of self-esteem for Soviet citizens, the foundation of its foreign policy ideology and notions of "universal and historical mission" of the Soviet Union as the leader of world communism. Nationals of the new Russia could not think anything of that kind with regard to their country. The new democratic environment, in which the Russian Federation was trying to "fit" has already had its own leader and its own "Messiah." The United States, like the Soviet Union, also saw themselves as a unique country - "the world's first victorious state of freedom" and "leader of world democracy." The balance of powers that existed between Moscow and Washington in the early 1990s, the problem of their rivalry in any sense, could not stand in the current environment. A key line of behavior of Russian diplomacy was "leveling" of the its positions on international issues with the positions of the US and Western Europe, which together with the reunited Germany in the 1992 officially proclaimed themselves as the European Union. The period 1992-1993 has been an amazing time. The Russian government has avoided to clearly indicate its national interests regarding foreign policy, identifying them with those of democratic countries, "the world community of democracies" in general. "Moscow strongly urged international partners - in spite of their lack of confidence - to recognize that support for the initiatives of the Western countries is the main foreign policy goal of the Russian Federation. A typical figure in this respect was the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Kozyrev". (Kozyrev, A. Partnership Strategy / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 1. Book. 1 / Comp. TA Shaklein. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 150-166). The logic of his foreign policy, based on the line of "democratic solidarity", is most clearly manifested in the behavior of Moscow during the initial period of the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991-1992). Russia unreservedly supported the formation of new independent states on the territory of former federation - first Slovenia and Croatia, and then - Bosnia and Macedonia. Moscow declared its diplomatic recognition of new governments of the former Yugoslavia together with the European Union, and before such declaration had been made by the United States. It is significant that Washington did not hurry with a decision concerning the recognition of new states, assessing possible complications in the case of anticipated opposition from Moscow and a potential war on the Balkans. Refusal of Russia to support the central government in Belgrade against the separatist Croatia and Slovenia was a surprise to many Western diplomats. But Russian leaders had their own logic. Having come to power under the banner of "self-determination of Russia from the USSR", feeling vulnerable to charges of aiding and abetting separatism in general, Boris Yeltsin sought to prove their strength and integrity. The actions of Russian diplomacy on the Balkans in the early 1990s had to demonstrate the consistent support of Moscow's principle of "right of nations for self-determination" applicable to all situations within the former Soviet Union and beyond. Within the country at this time the Russian government has led a risky game with the separatists, using them against a large part of the "pre Yeltsin" Soviet party and state elite, which kept the power in the Russian regions and did not trust Boris Yeltsin. Therefore, local nationalists seized power in autumn 1991 in Chechnya with such ease, and were trying to repeat the success in other republics of Northern Caucasus and the Volga region. The policy of decentralization, part of which was an extremely liberal interpretation of the principle of "right of nations to self-determination", in fact, helped Boris Yeltsin. Because of it regional elite, autonomous republics and economically prosperous regions of Russia eventually not only provided political support for the president, but also provided the necessary material resources in exchange for recognition by the federal government of their rights and privileges (including tax relief), which together led to a redistribution of power in Russia between the center and the regions in favor of the latter. Russian foreign policy in this regard and during this period was a reflection and extension of the interior one. By destroying the Soviet system in the country, the Russian government without regret has helped to break the remains of the old international order. The latter seemed to be part of the heritage of the Soviet Union from which they could safely get rid of, bearing in mind that every step in the destruction of this heritage in the Moscow interpreted as evidence of its commitment to solidarity with the West. Meantime, in the U.S and the EU the debate unfolded regarding a new world order and global democratic society. Being immersed in the internal turmoil in the first half of the 1990s, Russia could not pursue an active foreign policy. And it was not trying to do so. The growth of the U.S. presence in Eastern Europe (Central-Eastern Europe) and the former Soviet Union did not cause any protest or opposition. Russia not only expressed no concern about the proclaimed in September 1993 American concept of "expanding democracy", but welcomed it wrongly assuming that the program would bring her a direct financial benefit. This concept has proclaimed the most important foreign policy challenge of the United States to support democratic reforms and building democracy in the former socialist countries of Europe. Theoretically, this also included Russia, although in fact, virtually all U.S. assistance towards establishing democracy was addressed to former "Warsaw Pact" countries completely disregarding Russia. Just as an aid to Western Europe under the Marshall Plan in 1947 was intended to create binding of Western European countries to the U.S., the concept of "spread democracy" was supposed to solve (and it in fact did) this task in relation to the former Eastern European socialist countries. It has contributed to the total destruction of their economic, cultural and other ties with Moscow. Countries in the region shifted in economic terms to the interaction with the European Union, and in the political and military - in cooperation with the United States. The United States became the most influential political force in this part of the world, "intercepting " the role from the "old" European leaders - France and Germany. As a result of the concept of "expanding democracy" Russia has not received anything. However, the loyalty that it showed towards the U.S. activities in Eastern Europe, that meekness with which it perceived its exclusion from this part of the world, brought some of the winnings. U.S. and EU countries supported the requests of Moscow to the international financial institutions - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Large-scale borrowing from these institutions have been in those days an important condition for the economic survival of Russia, which since 1992 as a result of "shock therapy" of the Government of Yegor Gaidar was in a situation close to economic collapse. Characteristically, by providing concessional assistance to the Eastern European countries, the Western countries did not provide similar benefits to Russia. The financial and economic assistance was delivered to it on the usual conditions. For such a choice of the West there were several reasons. Firstly, it was important to complete the reform of small and medium-sized ex-socialist countries as quickly as possible and with the predominance of Western aid. Secondly, it was in the interests of international creditors to impose the large financial commitment upon Russia, interest on which, together with the principal sum had to substantially exceed the original loan amount. Lending to Russia does not seem a risky investment for international experts taking into account the export potential of its energy. Thirdly, accepted obligations to loans by Russia had given the international institutions levers of influence on the economic policy of the Russian government. IMF and the World Bank provided funds on such harsh conditions, that lenders have had the opportunity to control the actions of the borrowing country. The first half of the 1990s - is the time not only of the collapse of relations with former socialist countries, but also with the states of the Arab East, South Asia, Africa and Latin America. Russia 'left' part of the world - especially from those countries which where connected with military-political cooperation and geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union upon global leadership. This kind of diplomatic retreat has been explained in the country as a need for better use of scarce foreign policy resources. Outside Russia, this line was presented as a conscious move away from unnecessary rivalry with the West at the points that had no significance for Russian interests, but had a value, for example, for the interests of the United States and the EU (Latin America, Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa). This period is connected with an important, meaningful innovation at that time. For the first time in history the subject of official bilateral discussions at the international level was the internal politics of Russia. The Soviet Union has always firmly adhered to the principle not to discuss the international negotiations regarding issues of domestic policy. All the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence contained provisions on the right of each country to choose its own version of the political system. This principle has been enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and many other international documents. n June 1992, Moscow took a step toward the demise of this principle position. During the visit of Boris Yeltsin to Washington the Charter of the Russian-American partnership and friendship was signed. In the preamble and several parts of this doctrine have been specified the principles which the Russian government intended to follow upon the conduct of domestic policy which stated its willingness to support the United States. These principles were identified as "democracy, freedom, human rights, respect for minority rights, including the national ones" (The Charter of the Russian-American partnership and friendship / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 2. Documents / Comp. Tatyana Shakleina. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 442-443, 447). This was the first time in Russian history, when the document concluded with a foreign state, regulated provisions relating to public order and internal affairs of Russia. The Charter was a "code of conduct" to which the Russian government pledged to follow. In fact, Moscow has agreed to recognize behind the United States a right to be an informal arbiter in the evaluation of the Russian reforms. The literature sources has featured the phrase "homework" of Russia - it was a set of a moral and political commitments necessary to carry out internal reforms, which would enable to prepare it for a meaningful partnership with the West. The same document contained a provision on the "indivisibility of security" of North America and Eurasia: "Security is indivisible from Vancouver [Pacific port in Canada on Canadian-American border] to Vladivostok. " By signing the Charter, Russia has officially linked its national security with national security of NATO countries. In the understanding of the Russian government provision of its security now clearly conceived in the context of cooperation with NATO. It highlighted the formation of a "quasi alliance" between Russia and the United States. American politicians talked about the fact that the basis of Russian-American rapprochement is cooperation in the democratic transformation of Russia, the construction of a free society and market economy. For several years the idea of "democratic solidarity" between Russia and the West eclipsed controversy that existed in their relationship. wo years of economic disaster (1992-1993), crisis management, massive delays of wages, inflation, rising prices, strikes - all was attributed in Russia with a course of radical liberal reforms. The left opposition accused the president of neglecting national interests and implementation of policies that would benefit the West. The negative attitude toward the authorities exacerbated by the October events in 1993, during which the opposition to Boris Yeltsin was suppressed by force on behalf of members of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The first elections to the State Duma of Russia in December 1993 showed a sharp drop in popularity of pro-presidential forces and the rise of nationalist sentiment. Enthusiasm for the benefits of cooperation with the West, from which a liberal portion of Russian society was expecting effective help in the name of "democratic solidarity" grew weaker. There were growing doubts about the true goals of Western countries towards Russia. The Americans were accused of wanting to "take advantage of the plight of Russia." With no intention to change the foreign policy, the government tried to change the official phraseology. At the beginning of 1994 during the first speeches after the last elections to the Duma, Russia's Foreign Minister Alexander Kozyrev first ventured to say about "special interests" of Russia in the zone of the former Soviet republics. Although it was not followed by the activation of Russian policy in the CIS, the words of Minister symbolized a new trend: under pressure of public sentiment the administration began to realize the need to modify at least the ideological and theoretical component of foreign policy. The authorities tried to connect the logic of the "democratic solidarity" with the elements of liberal statism (liberal nationalism) with absolute predominance of the former. On practice, this resulted in the continuation of policy coordination with the U.S. and the EU. But now the co-operation was accompanied by reservations, and timid attempts of Russian diplomacy to accompany it with the nomination of certain conditions. Either Russia would become effective, including military and political aspects, tool of solidarity actions with the West, or it needed to clearly define the limits of rapprochement with it. In the first case, perhaps it was necessary to prepare for joint action with NATO in the Balkans or in peacekeeping operations in Africa. In the second - should formulate some kind of interaction rules that would restrict the behavior of both NATO and Russia. Meanwhile the reality of the mid-1990s became more controversial. In 1995 the war in Bosnia reached its climax. September of 1995 was followed by NATO's intervention in this country, which caused criticism in Russia against not only of the the Western powers but also Boris Yeltsin and A. Kozyrev, for their failure to prevent such actions. That same year elections to the State Duma which has already carried out under the new Constitution, showed a further decline in the popularity of the president and the growing popularity of anti-Western forces in Russia. In the West, new developments have taken into account in its own way, and in 1995 they started to openly discuss the prospects of NATO expansion to the east. In Moscow, this was fairly regarded as an attempt to exert pressure on Russia and the expression of the latent threat from the West. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1996 Boris Yeltsin had to go through the presidential elections, the chances to win which where were small. In this situation the government has made a deliberate and symbolic change: "too westernized" Alexander Kozyrev was replaced as foreign minister at the beginning of 1996 by Primakov, who had a reputation as a strong politician and moderate statesman. He was not ashamed of words about the need to defend national interests, but also made them a constant refrain of his own presentations and speeches from his subordinate senior foreign ministry officials. "Primakov, in fact, compared with its predecessor, began to speak more often about relations with its Asian neighbors - Japan, China, India and Arab countries" (E.M. Primakov International Relations on the brink of the XXI century / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 1. Book. 1 / Comp. Tatyana Shakleina. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 179-195). He considered the collapse of relations with Latin America not justified. But being a realist, Primakov was not seduced over the the relation of opportunity between world powers and did not question the policy of partnership with the most powerful and promising of them. He saw his task as the minister not to oppose Russian interests in the west, but to teach the West the need to negotiate all the major decisions that affect their interests with Moscow. In 1991-1995, Russian diplomacy did not dare even to encroach on it. Diplomacy was geared to minimize the damage from the major international processes, in which Russia was objectively included, but in the regulation of which it actually took no part. It is important to note that the focus on partnership with the West have not questioned. The novelty consisted in the transition to a more active protection of it's interests by Moscow. The foreign policy of Russia in the second half of the 1990s, was no longer based on "democratic solidarity". The conceptual meaning of the Russian foreign policy of the second half of the 1990's is best conveyed by the phrase "selective partnership". This concept has had been focused on the preference of cooperation with the U.S. and the EU. However, it accentuated the spirit of Russia's hard bargaining negotiations with the West, defending its views and the right to determine in which cases it to be at one with its Western partners, and in which to distance itself from them. The new approach began to emerge during Primakov's term and remained with appointment of Ivanov who became foreign minister in September 1998 following the appointment of Primakov as prime minister. It seemed that a universal formula of foreign policy had been found. It was both pragmatic and principled. Principled because it did not put into question the vector of partnership with the West. Pragmatic - because the logic of "selectivity" (resistance or partnership) gave policy flexibility. Pragmatic because the logic of "selectivity" (resistance or partnership) gave this policy flexibility. Last years of the twentieth century turned out to be the difficult test for Russia's foreign policy. Having measured and estimated weakness of Russia after the crisis, West "as if on purpose" started to reckon with Russia even less. If the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia in 1996 could pass off as the result of concerted decisions of Russia, NATO and the EU, the conflict over Kosovo in 1999, had been intervened by Western countries in defiance of Moscow. In the midst of the "Kosovo crisis" in the spring of 1999 President Boris Yeltsin decided to make a principal changes in military doctrine of the Russian Federation. In its new version, approved in 2000 was stipulated the right of Russia for the "first nuclear strike" from which the Soviet Union voluntarily refused in the late 1970s. Russia and the West under the pressure of the experience of relations in the 1990s, got rid of the mutual illusions, but at the same time kept the relationship in a non-confrontational line, making use of new instruments and mechanisms. In 2000, the experience of Russia-NATO interaction of the second half of the 1990s was summed up in the "Russian foreign policy doctrine of the second generation, the essence of which has been sustained in the spirit of selective partnership" (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. June 28, 2000 / / Foreign and Security Policy of modern Russia in four volumes. 1991-2002. T. 4 / Comp. Tatyana Shakleina. M. ROSPEN, 2002. P. 109-121). The rise to power of Vladimir Putin (first "preliminary" in 1999, and then "final" in 2000) did not immediately reveal the changes. In the media coverage coming of Vladimir Putin has been marked by a wave of laments over the "instability" of Russia's relations with the West and the growth of Russia-NATO differences. Under president Putin, Russian foreign policy has experienced a revival that contains elements of both restoration and revolution. Russia is back on the world stage, seeking legitimization of its new role and projecting power through economic, as opposed to traditional political-military means. It has revived a pre-revolutionary national identity stressing Russias unique path to modernity. Relations with the West have deteriorated as Russia has challenged agreements that were concluded in the 1990s when it was weak. The Putin legacy in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is mixed; with gains in Central Asia and losses in the Western newly independent states (NIS) and the South Caucasus. However, unless Russia addresses its domestic societal problems its ability to play the role of a great power will remain limited. After a decade of weakness and upheaval, Russia returned to the world stage during Vladimir Putins eight-year presidency, regaining influence in its neighborhood and beyond, and venturing into parts of the globe from which it retreated after the Soviet collapse. Moreover, Putins Russia sought to revise many of the major agreements it had concluded with the West in the 1990s, when it was weak and had to accept an agenda imposed on it by Europe and the United States. This is the restorative aspect of the new Russian foreign policy, symbolized by its hosting the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg in 2006 and its award of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The revolutionary part is that Russia is, for the first time in its history, a major global economic player, especially in the energy field, after years of strong domestic economic performance driven by high oil prices. It could become a serious outward investor as it is poised to dispose of potential sovereign wealth funds and as its corporations go global. As First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said at the 2008 Munich Security Conference, we dont export ideology anymore-we only export goods and capital (Ivanov 2008). Moreover, the Putin administration, by recapturing the commanding heights of the economy, created a system whereby the Kremlin is directly involved in international economic activity, blurring the lines between what is political and what is commercial. This new Russian reality expressed itself in increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward the West. Putins 2007 Munich Security Conference speech lambasted American unilateralism (Putin 2007a) and in his final address to the State Council he accused the West of unleashing a new arms race and trying to gain access to Russias natural resources (Putin 2008). This rhetoric had a negative effect on Russias political relations with both Europe and the United States, although economic ties with the West became robust. Russia remains without allies, pursuing multi-vector policies. As Foreign Minister Lavrov explained, Russia will continue playing its balancing role in global affairs. It will never be part of new holy alliances against anybody (Lavrov 2007). It seeks to ensure that no major international problems can be resolved without its participation and ability to influence the terms of the settlement. Russian foreign policy under Putin underwent a dramatic evolution, mirroring the domestic changes implemented by the president. Taking office in the aftermath of the 1998 financial collapse and the pluralist but politically weak Yeltsin years, Putin restored stability to the country by reining in forces of decentralisation and competition, creating the power vertical, restoring control over the country by the Kremlin and its allied party United Russia, and recapturing state control over the commanding heights of the economy. He was lucky enough to preside over this restoration while oil prices skyrocketed from $27 a barrel in 2000 to $130 a barrel by mid-2008. Where under Yeltsin powerful oligarchs could sometimes pursue their own commercial interests abroad, under Putin foreign policy-making was recentralised. Indeed, during the Putin years, it became increasingly challenging to understand how Russian foreign policy is made. On many crucial decisions-for instance, support for the United States establishing military bases in Central Asia after 9/11, support of Viktor Yanukovich during the 2004 Ukrainian elections or turning off the gas to Ukraine in January 2006-the assumption was that President Putin himself was the ultimate decision maker. Nevertheless, it appeared that the domestic power vertical extended to foreign policy which was made by a narrow circle of people. To some extent, the emergence of Russia for the first time ever as a major global economic player was a result of forces outside the Kremlins control, namely high energy prices. In 2007, Russian economic output was 70% larger than in 1999 in real terms and Russian economic performance was considerably above what was predicted a few years earlier. Putin pursued a skilful economic policy for much of his time in office, with sound fiscal measures, the creation of a fund from energy profits that could be used for investment in Russia and abroad, the early payback of Russias foreign debt and some domestic diversification away from an economy based solely on raw materials production and export. Putin succeeded in one of his key goals-restoring Russias status as a great power whose interests have to be taken into account by the international community. This is partly a product of Russias growing economic clout, but also because the international environment created opportunities that Putin, initially playing a weak hand rather well, was able to use to Russias advantage. The major legacy of the Putin era that is in part a consequence of the brittle nature of the US-Russian relationship is Russias determination to revise the agreements of the 1990s, ensure that it never again signs up to policies determined solely by the West and insist that no major international problem can be resolved without Russias participation. If need be, Russia will do everything it can to prevent resolution of these issues, as the case of Kosovo shows. Putin improved ties with new EU members, largely through economic and energy diplomacy. He visited the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria and signed energy deals with them that guarantee greater Russian control of the European market. Thus, the European picture was mixed. Many of the new EU members have only recently emerged from centuries-or at least decades-of Russian and Soviet domination and remain wary of Russias intentions. However, dependence on Russian energy and traditional economic links remain, and Russias presence in Central Europe is greater today than it was in 2000. At the end of the Putin presidency, the West was more wary of Russia than it was at the beginning of his tenure. And it is questionable whether the highly centralised system that Putin has restored is really an adequate model for a great power in the twenty-first century. The domestic and international legacy of this sovereign democracy will outlast the Putin era, but it could eventually limit Russias ability to play the role of a twenty-first century great global power if the Kremlin does not fully address its domestic challenges and if it continues its confrontational stance toward the West. Following the breakthrough of Putin in the field of foreign affairs, the newly elected, by that time, president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev on August 31, 2008 announced the "five positions" of Russian foreign policy: 1)Primacy of the fundamental principles of international law. 2)Rejection of a unipolar world and the construction of a multipolar world. 3)Avoiding isolation and confrontation with other countries. 4)Protection of lives and dignity of Russian citizens "no matter where they are." 5)Protecting the interests of Russia in the "friendly regions." The highlights of Medvedevs foreign policy include the new European security architecture initiative launched during his visit to Germany in June 2008, a month after he assumed office, a five-day war with Georgia later that year, the subsequent statement on "the sphere of privileged interests" and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A gas war with Ukraine left part of Europe without heat in the middle of winter, but then Russia signed the "Gas for Fleet" agreement, under which it cut gas prices for Ukraine in return for an extension of the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea. Medvedev has exchanged words with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, against whom he even initiated a media war. In a surprise move, Russia approved military intervention in Libya but later said that it was a mistake. Medvedevs visit to the South Kurils caused a sharp deterioration in relations with Japan. His indirect foreign policy achievements include the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and progress in relations with Poland, although Vladimir Putin contributed more to both of these than Medvedev. Analyzing Russias activity in the period from spring 2008 to autumn 2011, it could be pointed out that its foreign policy was not the sole responsibility of Medvedev, but a joint effort of the ruling tandem, even though Putin stayed behind the scenes for the most part. A closer look at Russias foreign policy achievements leads to a paradoxical conclusion. Medvedev, with his friendly smile and pro-modernization rhetoric so acceptable to Europe and the United States, was widely seen as a pro-Western politician. Yet Russia has made hardly any advances on the Western front, while its anti-Western or alternative policy directions have proved much more successful. Medvedev has set out a policy which will be continued under Putin: Russia's transformation into a power with a regional focus, although the region in this case is Eurasia, which adds a global dimension. As a conclusion to this chapter it might be stated that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia endured a difficult rebirth into a unipolar world order where it struggled to find its place for some time. For some time it carried out the role of a dependent upon the will and interests of the West. This had been the most significant right after the collapse of the USSR. But with time Russia had found levers of influence on the global stage and now is becoming close to a status of major political force in the world. Russian modern foreign policy might be described as a multipolar international system, where a plurality of stakeholders shares the burden of enforcing international law and guaranteeing global stability. All three presidents had made a significant influence of the foreign policy of Russian Federation, although their methods and tools of influence differed depending on the situation. Having been left with "broken trough", after collapse of the USSR, Yeltsin tried to carry out the politics of non-interference and obliquely help its yesterday's sworn enemy to establish authority at what has been recent strongholds of social ideology. No one can blame him for that as it is in general the ordinary historical contour. Besides, Russian had to deal with the vast array of internal problems and preserving the leftovers from regime was it's natural and logical option. Putin managed to grope the strong suit of renewed Russia (natural resources) and utilize it as a tool of influence of the international arena. He wasn't an obedient lamb, the sense of authority is in his subconscious I recon (maybe because of his IS (intelligence service) past). Nevertheless, he propelled Russia on the qualitatively new level of diplomatic game. Medvedev was but a successor of Putin's ideas and trends. But his term brought some new directions of Russian foreign policy development. It began to pay more attention to Eurasia distancing itself from Europe to the merit of a economical cooperation. Russia is perceived not as a peasant waving red flag, but a bunch of suits sitting on the oil pipe counting profit. Is it for the best of worst the next chapter of dissertation will try to reveal. In general pubic eyes, Russian bureaucrats made numerous miscalculations in conducting international relations as initiating the military conflicts or speculating on natural resources supply and it may result in a unfavorable consequences. But at the same it might be the part of some major plan, which is unavailable for the public. Nevertheless, those events definitely are worth analyzing.

  • 117. SNW – Анализ
    Доклад пополнение в коллекции 12.01.2009

    Наименование стратегической позицииКачественная оценка позицииСильная (S)Нейтральная (N)Слабая (W)1Стратегия организации2Бизнес-стратегии (в целом), в том числе2,1Бизнес 12,2Бизнес 22,3Бизнес 32,4Бизнес 42,5Бизнес 53Оргструктура4Финансы, как общее финансовое положение4,1Финансф как состояние текущего баланса4,2Финансы как уровень бух. Учета4,3Финансы как финструктура4,4Финансы как доступность инвестиционных ресурсов4,5Финансы как уровень финансового менеджмента5Продукт как конкурентноспособность в целом5,1Продукт 15,2Продукт 25,3Продукт 35,4Продукт 45,5Продукт 56Структура затрат (в целом), в том числе6,1Бизнес 16,2Бизнес 26,3Бизнес 36,4Бизнес 46,5Бизнес 57Дистрибуция как система реализации продукции (в целом), в том числе7,1Как материальная структура7,2Как уменеие торговать8Информационная технология9Инновации как способ к реализации на рынке продуктов10Способность к лидерству в целом, в том числе10,1Способность к лидерству 1 ого лица10,2Способность к лидерству всего персонала10,3Способность к лидерству как совокупность объективных факторов11Уровень производства в целом, в том числе11,1Качество материальной базы11,2Как качество инженеров11,3Как качество рабочих12Уровень маркетинга13Уровень менеджмента14Качество торговой марки15Качество персонала16Репутация на рынке17Репутация как работодателя18Отношения с органами власти (в целом), в том числе18,1С федеральным правительством18,2С правительством субъекта федерации18,3С органами местного самоуправления18,4С системой налогового контроля19Отношения с профсоюзами (в целом), в том числе19,1с корпоративными19,2с отраслевыми20Оношение со смежниками21Инновации как исследования и разработки22Послепродажное обслуживание23Степень вертикальной интегрированности24Корпоративная культура25Стратегичесике альянсыДополнительные стратегические позиции (с учетом специфики организации)2627282930

  • 118. Spider Project - первая российская система управления профессионального уровня
    Информация пополнение в коллекции 12.01.2009

    Отличия в задании ресурсов наиболее значительны. Ресурсы подразделяются на возобновляемые (люди, механизмы) и невознобляемые (материалы). В большинстве пакетов те и другие задаются вместе, отличия обычно заключаются лишь в задании стоимости их использования - в час или за единицу. В Spider Project эти виды ресурсов задаются отдельно. При этом можно задать, что возобновляемые ресурсы потребляют материалы (пример: автомобиль потребляет бензин). Тогда назначив ресурсы на исполнение операций проекта вы автоматически учитываете попутное потребление необходимых материалов. Кроме отдельных ресурсов можно задать мультиресурсы и пулы. Мультиресурсы - это группы ресурсов, которые выполняют работы вместе (например, бригада, экипаж, автомобиль с шофером и т.д.). Мультиресурсы можно назначать на исполнение операций целиком, что означает назначение всех ресурсов, которые в них входят. Пулы - это группы взаимозаменяемых ресурсов. Основное отличие от подходов, используемых в других пакетах, в которых имеется skill scheduling, заключается в том, что ресурсы пула могут иметь различные производительности.

  • 119. SWOT – анализ
    Вопросы пополнение в коллекции 12.01.2009

    «SWOT анализ обычно применяется для сопоставления данных анализа внутренней и внешней среды организации и сведения их в единое целое, что позволяет получить общую картину действительности». На данный момент мы уже имеем анализ возможностей и угроз, а также анализ слабых и сильных сторон компании, поэтому сейчас нужно только сопоставить эти два анализа, для того чтобы получить общую картину положения предприятия. Так как SWOT анализ дает общую картину в нем не нужно давать веса характеристикам и ранжировать их.

  • 120. SWOT-анализ компании "Tikkurila"
    Курсовой проект пополнение в коллекции 19.09.2012

    Внешние факторы Внутренние факторыСильные стороны (S) 1. Существенный опыт компании в работе на северо- и восточноевропейском рынке 2. Широкий ассортимент продукции 3. Собственная «Школа маляров» 4. Научные центры и лаборатории 5. Высокий уровень информированности потребителей о бренде 6. Положительный образ компании 7. Бюджет формируется на основе детализированных плановСлабые стороны (W) 1. Некорректная работа с персоналом 2. Сложность прогнозирования цен на сырье 3. Трудности с дистрибуцией продукции 4. Отсутствие единого стиля упаковки 5. Недостаточно широкая известность российских брендов компанииВозможности (O) 1. Привлекательность инвестиций в премиум-сегмент, большой потенциал красок для интерьера, высокие показатели среднего сегмента 2. Ослабление конкурентов 3. Забота о здоровье человека и экологии очень приветствуется потребителем 4. Рост некоторых сегментов рынка, являющихся потенциальными клиентами компании 5. ИнновацииСтратегические опции SO: 1. Разработка новых экологичных красок и красок на основе нанотехнологийS4O3O5 2. Инвестиции в прибыльные сегменты с минимальным риском S2S3S6S7O1 3. Увеличение объемов производимой продукции, нацеленной на растущего потенциального клиента S1S5O2O4 Стратегические опции WO: 1. Создание необходимых условий труда для работников W1O3 2. Воспользоваться ростом среднего сегмента рынка и ослаблением конкурентов для популизации брендов W5O1O2O4 3. Оптимизация затрат и эффективности работы компании в кризисный периодW2W3O2Угрозы (T) 1. Клиенты сетевых форматов 2. Застой в сегменте универсальных красок 3. Активная рекламная деятельность конкурентов. Разработка собственных колеровочных систем ключевыми игроками рынка. 4. Строгие законы, касающиеся экологических красок, из-за которых увеличивается себестоимость продукции.Стратегические опции ST: 1. Ориентация на специализированные краски S2T2 2. Проведение агрессивной рекламной кампании для привлечения новых клиентов S5S6T3 3. Разработка наименьших по себестоимости новых продуктовS4T4Стратегические опции WT: 1. Наладить систему дистрибуции с помощью сетевых компаний и розничных точек продажи W3T1 2. Стабилизировать каналы поставки высококачественного сырья, соответствующего всем экологическим нормам W2T4 3. Перенять опыт конкурентов, направить свои силы на усиление маркетингового отделаW4O3